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FORECLOSURES BY THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE

W

By Malcolm Lindsey of the Denver Bar
E are indebted to Mr. Mortimer Stone of Ft. Collins
for his challenge of foreclosures by the public trustee
at the April meeting of the Denver Bar Association.
Mr. Stone has caused us to think and to investigate; and
although I, personally, have arrived at very different conclusions from his, I am grateful that he brought up the subject,
just because he did make me investigate.
Mr. Stone's conclusion seemed to be that a title passing
through a public trustee contains possible elements of uncertainty. For convenience I will divide my answer into
several parts.
I.
ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN EVERY TITLE

Even if there were elements of uncertainty in a title passing through a public trustee, still that, of itself, would not be
sufficient ground to warrant giving up the practice of foreclosure by the public trustee. In every title it is axiomatic
that the following, among other possible uncertainties, exist:
(a) Forgery;
(b) Insanity of grantor;
(c)
Minority of grantor.
We have tried to bring about some protection against
forgery by having deeds acknowledged; but the bond of a
Notary Public is only $1,000 which would not form adequate
protection in most transactions. In cases of insanity and
minority, a buyer would have no protection except a possible
suit for a money judgment, as he would acquire no lien on the
property purchased. In the case of a foreclosure by the public
trustee, however defective, the buyer would at least become an
equitable assignee and have a lien on the foreclosed property
to the extent of the amount of the trust deed. This fact alone
gives the purchaser at a sale by the public trustee substantial
protection.
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II.
COURT FORECLOSURES HAVE DISADVANTAGES

The alternative for foreclosure by the public trustee is
foreclosure in court; but a court foreclosure has the following
disadvantages:
(a) Extra cost;
(b) Extra delay;
(c) The uncertainty of service of process.
In perhaps a majority of cases where foreclosure is
necessary, there has been an abandonment of the property, so
a court foreclosure must depend on constructive service of
process in many cases. The whole subject of constructive
service of process is not free from uncertainty.
In Gibson v. Wagner, 25 C. A. 129, our Court of Appeals
held a court decree to quiet title defective because of the particular wording of an affidavit for publication. Our Supreme
Court, later, in Hanshue v. Investment Co., 67 Colo. 189, held
a court decree to be Valid under an affidavit for publication
with exactly the same wording. This brought me the humiliation attendarnt upon the fact that I had rejected the title to
perhaps a dozen tracts of land, basing such rejection on the
decision in the Gibson case, which titles later became good
under the Hanshue decision.
III.
OUR COLORADO COURTS FAVOR REMEDIAL TITLE LEGISLATION

The Public Trustee act falls into the class of remedial
title legislation. In the case of the Torrens title act, another
piece of remedial legislation, our Supreme Court has gone
very far in sustaining the remedial legislation.
White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513
A registration of land under the Torrens Act was sustained, even against minor heirs, not actually served, where
the statutory provisions had been complied with.
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IV.
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF OFFICIAL ACTS

Mr. Stone cited a number of Colorado cases to the effect
that there is no presumption in favor of the regularity of the
acts of a trustee; but on examination of these cases it develops
that each of such decisions was rendered in regard to a private
trustee acting under a deed of trust given prior to 1894 when
the Public Trustee act was adopted.
The public trustee is a public official and we are all
familiar with the rule that the regularity of the acts of a
public official are presumed. Our Supreme Court has
recognized this rule in the following cases:
Colorado Fuel Co. v. Maxwell Co. 22 Colo. 71, survey of
public land officials.
Colo. Fuel & Iron Co. v. State Land Board 14 C. A. 84,
regularity of meeting of Land Board.
Cofield v. McClelland 1 Colo. 370, 16 Wall. 331, notices
by the Probate Judge concerning the Denver townsite.
V.
COLORADO DECISIONS SPECIFICALLY ON FORECLOSURES BY

PUBLIC TRUSTEES

So far we have been considering the subject generally.
We will now take up the specific Colorado decisions under
our Public Trustee act.
Healey v. Zobel, 45 Colo. 294, 101 Pac. 56
A trust deed and the foreclosure under it were sustained
although:
(a)
The trust deed ran to the "Public Trustee" without
specifying the county;
(b) The trust deed did not specify the period of advertisement; the Court holding that in such a case the advertisement should be for a reasonable period.
Watkins v. Booth, 55 Colo. 91
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Foreclosure of first trust deed by Public Trustee. Notice
to holder of second trust deed mailed to it at address given in
its trust deed although parties in charge of foreclosure knew
that its address had changed and failed to call the attention of
the Public Trustee to this change. Foreclosure sustained.
Clark v. Duvall, 61 Colo. 76
Foreclosure by Public Trustee. Notice defective by
leaving out "feet" in description of land. Before the foreclosure Weld County by legislative action had been added to
those counties where the Governor appoints the Public
Trustee. No appointment had yet been made.
Court sustained the foreclosure, holding description
sufficient and that the County Treasurer held over until a new
Public Trustee was appointed by virtue of Section 1 of Article
XII. of the Constitution providing:
"Every person holding any civil office under the state or any municipality
shall, unless removed according to law, exercise the duties of his office until
his successor is duly qualified."

VI.
CONCLUSION

The one point in which the writer agreed with Mr. Stone
was concerning the statute regarding foreclosure where the
maker of the trust deed or the person liable on the indebtedness had died. This statute, as it stood when Mr. Stone
spoke, required permission of court or court foreclosure within one year of such death; and in examining a title there would
be no way to learn of such death. Fortunately, however, since
Mr. Stone made his address, our legislature, by enacting
Senate Bill 113, Session Laws 1931, cured this defect.
The Public Trustee act arose out of the 1893 panic and
was for the purpose of protecting people of small means in the
following two particulars:
(a) It gave a period of redemption not allowed under
foreclosures by private trustees;.
(b) It kept down the costs of foreclosure so that same
would not be prohibitive.
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We are now in a period of depression comparable to that
following 1893, when there are many foreclosures, and are
therefore able to appreciate the wisdom of this legislation.
We all recognize the public duty which we owe, as members of the Bar; and it seems to me that this is a particular
instance where a public duty rests upon us. The Public
Trustee act has been in almost universal use for 37 years in
this state-long enough to fully demonstrate that it does carry
out the beneficent purposes for which it was enacted; and at
the same time we have come to know that it affords creditors a
simple procedure and one much more rapid than a court foreclosure.
The Secretary of the Denver Bar Association has asked
me to refer to a contention which recently has been made that
a judgment creditor still has three months after the first six
months in which to redeem from a sale by the public trustee.
This contention is based upon the fact that the 1929 act (with
the 1931 amendment) refers only to "incumbrancers" and
"lienors" and does not in its terms include judgment creditors.
Of course a judgment creditor may make himself a lienor by
filing a transcript of his judgment; but it has been suggested
that he need not file such transcript and that, unless he files
such transcript, he is not a lienor.
This argument would seem to overlook the fact that the
filing of a transcript is not the only way in which a judgment
creditor can obtain a lien. He likewise obtains a lien by
making a levy; and causing a levy to be made was the first step
the judgment creditor had to take under the 1894 Public
Trustee act if he wished to make a redemption. Section 5055
C. L. 1921 provided that a judgment creditor wishing to redeem "shall sue out an execution upon his judgment, and place
the same in the hands of the proper officer to execute, and
thereupon such officer shall endorse upon the back of said
execution a levy upon the lands or tenements which said judgment creditor may wish to redeem."
The act of 1919 (Section 5932 C. L. 1921) provides that
when in any case a writ of execution is issued and a levy thereunder is made upon real estate "it shall be the duty of the
sheriff * * * to file a certificate of such fact with the recorder"
and Section 5934 expressly states that "the lien of an * * *
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execution levied on real estate" shall continue for six years
from the filing of the certificate by the sheriff. These various
statutory provisions show that the first step which a judgment
creditor had to take under the old Public Trustee act was to
make his judgment a lien by having the sheriff make a levy,
and that it was the duty of the sheriff to record a certificate of
such levy. This clearly brings the judgment creditor, who is
attempting to redeem, within the language of the second paragraph of Section 2 of the 1929 act on redemptions (no change
in this language having been made by the 1931 act) as follows:
"No lienor or encumbrancer shall be entitled to redeem unless within
the redemption period in the preceding section provided for, he files a notice of
his intention to redeem with the public trustee, sheriff, or other official making
the sale and unless his lien appears by instruments duly recorded or filed as
permitted by law."

It is apparent from this section that no lienor may redeem
unless two things concur:
(a) Within the first six months after the sale he must
file a notice with the public trustee of his intention to redeem;
(b) His lien must be recorded. In regard to the time
when the lien must be recorded the same Section 2 continues:
"No lienor shall be entitled to redeem under this section unless his lien
appears by an instrument so recorded or filed prior to the expiration of the six
month period of redemption in the preceding section provided for."

Construing all these statutes together, it seems clear that:
First, a judgment creditor seeking to redeem under the
old statute had to make himself a lien creditor by the levy of
his execution; and
Second, the acts of 1929 and 1931, which apply to all
lien creditors, must govern redemption by a judgment creditor,
because he must make himself a lien creditor by the levy of
his execution.
If these conclusions are sound, it necessarily follows that
redemption by a judgment creditor isgoverned by the acts of
1921 and 1931 and that the time of his redemption is limited
to six months.

